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Summary 
In this thesis, we propose a data integrity framework with the following 
functionalities: a server can specify its authorizations, active web 
intermediaries can provide services in accordance with the server's 
intention, and more importantly, a client is facilitated to verify the received 
message with the server's authorizations and intermediaries' traces. We 
implement the proxy-side of the framework on top of the Squid proxy 
server system and its client-side with Netscape Plug-in SDK. To summarize, 
my contributions are as follows. 
• Define a data integrity framework, its associated language specifi-
cation and its associated system model to solve the data integrity 
problem in active network with real-time content transformation. 
• Build a prototype of our data integrity model and do sets of 
experiments to show the practicability of our proposal through its 
low performance overhead and the feasibility of data reuse.
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1.1 Background and Problems 
World Wide Web has already emerged from a simple homogeneous environment to an 
increasingly heterogeneous one. In today's pervasive computing world, users are 
accessing information sources on the web through a wide variety of mobile and fixed 
devices. These devices have different display sizes and computing capacities. Their 
connectivity to the Internet such as cellular radio networks, local area wireless networks, 
dial-up connections and broadband connections have different network bandwidth 
availabilities. Web clients also raise their demands by having different preferences such 
as language and personalized content. Thus it is a challenge for the content server to 
provide the "best-fitted" presentation of the content to these diversified clients and 
networks with the same source of information. 
One key direction to provide better web quality services in such heterogeneous web 
environment is real-time content transformation. Basically, content transformation 
research is to study the methods of providing services more efficiently through 
real-time content adaptation to meet some special need or requirements. Examples of 
these services include: image transcoding, media conversion (e.g image to text), 
language translation, encoding (e.g. traditional Chinese to simple Chinese), and local 
advertisement uploading. 
To meet the wide variety of client demands, content providers support 
value-added services by themselves initially. Very soon, however, it is found that this 
approach is not efficient and sometimes even not appropriate. Not only does the 
workload of the server increases, but more importantly, it also creates problems for data 
caching and reuse. This problem arises because the best-fitted presentations of the same 
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content to two clients are likely to be different. Even a single client might want different 
best-fitted presentations at different instances due to his/her current bandwidth availability. 
There are also services such as local advertisement uploading or content-based filtering, 
where servers are either impossible or inappropriate to perform the task. Recently, one 
new direction is to migrate selected content manipulation and management functions to 
active web intermediaries. In such environment, clients can get these value-added services 
faster without servers' intervention. With the numerous efforts of technology development 
to handle real-time content transformation in proxy and wireless gateway in pervasive 
computing environment, working groups in the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) 
[1] start to engage in the related protocols and API definition and standardization, such 
as Open Pluggable Edge Services (OPES) working group [2]. 
However, one important question has been drawing increasing attention with the 
prosperity of research on content transformation by active web intermediaries. Since 
proxies may modify a message on the way from a server to a client, how much can a 
client trust the receiving message and how can a server ensure that what the client 
receives is what it intends to respond? It is a data integrity problem. 
 
1.2 Needed Work and Contributions 
According to the data integrity problem that we state in the last section, we would 
like to research on the following issues:  
• Language Specification  
It is essential for a server to specify its authorization that can be understood easily 
by authorized proxies. Only if the proxies can understand the authorizations, they 
can modify the message in accordance with the server's intention. On the other 
hand, the authorizations should also be understandable to the client so that they 
can be clues for the client to verify the message. All in all, we should provide 
servers with a language specification to meet these requirements. 
• Traces Leaving  
As far as the proxies are considered, they should leave some traces together with 
the modified message so that the client can verify the message and the server can also 
monitor their actions. To meet these requirements, the traces MUST be 
understandable to the client and the server. Therefore, the language specification 
SHOULD cover the specification of the proxies' traces. 
• Client Mechanisms  
Data integrity is very different from security. A message with the former 
requirement is visible to anyone whereas an encrypted message is visible only to 
certain parties who are able to decrypt it. So the client should define its own 
mechanism to measure how much it can trust the message with data integrity 
technique. 
In my thesis work, my contributions to the research community are as follows. 
• Define a data integrity framework, its associated language specification and 
system model to solve the data integrity problem in active network that supports 
real-time content transformation. 
• Build a prototype of our data integrity model and do sets of experiments to show 
the practicability of our proposal through its low performance overhead and the 
feasibility of data reuse. 
1.3 Organization 
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we review the development 
of real-time content transformation in the network and outline the existing mechanisms 
that handle data integrity problem caused by content transformation. In Chapter 3, we 
give an intuitive explanation of our work on data integrity problem from the viewpoint 
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of message exchange. In Chapter 4, we describe the main components of the language 
we propose to address the data integrity problem. In this chapter, it is made clear how a 
server specifies its intention. We then illustrate what traces an active web intermediary 
should leave and how our language supports this requirement in Chapter 5. In Chapter 
6, we propose a system model to solve the data integrity problem with the assistance 
of the specified language. The system model is the blueprint of a system 
implementation described in Chapter 7. We give an overview of Squid system and 
Netscape plug-in APIs, and illustrate how we make use of them to build our system. 
In order to prove the feasibility of our solution, we conduct experiments described in 
Chapter 8. In Chapter 9, we conclude our work. Finally, we give the formal syntax 




In this chapter, we review the development in real-time content transformation in the 
network and outline the existing mechanisms proposed to handle data integrity problem 
brought by content transformation.   
2.1 Content Transformation 
The problem of real-time content transformation in a heterogeneous networked 
environment has been studied quite extensively in the past few years. In general, there 
are 3 aspects of works that we would like to survey. 
 
2.1.1 Technologies at Original Server 
A lot of technologies have been done to facilitate server-side content transformation. 
Fragment-based page generation [18], [21] and delta encoding [31] reduce the server's 
load via the reuse of previously generated content for new requests. InfoPyramid [33] 
deploys server-side adaptation of multimedia objects for a wide range of clients with 
different capabilities through off-line transcoding. Recently, Oracle launches an Ora-
cle9i Wireless Application Server product [8] to serve the adapted content to mobile 
clients. 
 
2.1.2 Technologies at Active Web Intermediary 
Much work has been focusing on the deployment of content adaptation technology at 
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an active web intermediary. [27] presents evidence that on-the-fly adaptation by active 
web intermediaries is a widely applicable, cost-effective, and flexible technique. [16] 
designs and implements a Digestor, which dynamically modifies requested Web pages 
to achieve the best-fitted presentation document for a given display size. Mobiware [10] 
aims to provide a programmable mobile network that meets the service demands of 
adaptive mobile applications and addresses the inherent complexity of delivering 
scalable audio, video and real time services to mobile devices. [15] proposes a proxy 
based system MOWSER to facilitate mobile clients to visit web pages via transcoding of 
HTTP streams. [19] makes use of the bit-streaming feature of JPEG2000 to support 
scalable layered proxy-based transcoding with maximum (transcoded) data reuse. 
 
2.1.3 Protocols 
OPES working group [2] is chartered to define a framework and protocols to authorize 
and invoke value-added services. It engages in extending the functionality of a caching 
proxy to provide additional services that mediate, modify, and monitor object requests 
and responses. Similar to OPES, [30] proposes a Content Service Networks (CSN) for 
value-added service providers to put their applications into an infrastructure service 
network via "service" distribution channels. Not only does content provider but also 




From the above sections, we observe that real-time content transformation in the 
network has been becoming a key technology to meet the diversified needs of web 
clients. However, most of these works do not address the data integrity problem 
although they mention it in their implementation of active web intermediaries. 
Although OPES intents to maintain the end-to-end data integrity, the requirement and 
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the analysis of threats for OPES [13] are just put forwards by now without any solution. 
2.2 Data Integrity 
2.2.1 Requirements 
[13] analyzes most threats associated with the OPES environment. These threats can 
cover most of the problems in real-time content transformation in the network. Based 
on the dataflow of an OPES application, major threats to the content can be summarized 
as: 1) unauthorized proxies doing services on the object, 2) authorized proxies doing 
unauthorized services on the object, and 3) inappropriate content transformation being 
applied to the object such as advertisement flooding due to local advertisement 
insertion service. These threats may cause chaos to the content delivery service because 
the clients cannot get what they really request. Therefore, data integrity has been 
identified by IETF as a key item of research and development for the OPES group.
2.2.2 Traditional Data Integrity 
There have been solutions to data integrity problem. However, their context that these 
solutions assume is quite different from the new active web intermediary environment 
that we are researching here. 
• Integrity Protection [40]  
In HTTP/1.1, integrity protection is a way for a client and a server to verify not 
only each other's identity but also the authenticity of the data they send. When the 
client wants to post something to the server such as paying some bills, he will 
include the entire entity body of his message and personal information in the input of 
the digest function and send this digest value to the server. Likewise, the server 
will respond its data with a digest value calculated in the same way. The 
pre-condition for this approach, however, is that the server knows who the client 
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is (i.e. the user id and password are on the server). Moreover, if an adversary 
intercepts the user's information, especially, its password, it can take advantage of 
it to attack the server or the client. 
• Secure Sockets Layer [41] 
It does a good job to maintain the integrity of transferred data through the public 
internet since it ensures the security of the data through encryption. The server 
and the client can get a session key that no others can intercept after the SSL 
handshakes. They use the key to encrypt the data transferred so that the data 
cannot be tampered secretly by adversaries. 
While these methods are efficient in the traditional end-to-end communication 
environment, they fail to address the data integrity problem in active network with 
value-added services as web intermediaries. This is because they do not support any 
legal content modification during the data transmission process, even by authorized 
intermediaries. 
2.2.3 Data Integrity for Content Transformation in Active Network 
Major proposals that have been put forward to address the data integrity problem in 
active network are summarized as follows. 
• Delta-MD5  
To meet the need of data integrity for delta-encoding [31], [32] defines a new 
HTTP header "Delta-MD5" to carry the digest value of the reassembling HTTP 
response from several individual messages. However, this solution is proposed for 
delta-encoding exclusively. 
• VPCN [14] 
VPCN is proposed to solve the integrity problem brought by OPES. It makes use of 
the concept similar to Virtual Private Networks [24] to ensure the integrity of the 
transport of content among network nodes and at the same time, to support the 
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transformation on content provided that the nodes are inside a virtual private 
content network. The main problems for this approach are the potential high 
overhead and the restriction of performing value-added web services by a small 
predefined subset of proxy gateways only. Furthermore, this is only a very 
preliminary proposal, without any implementation to verify its correctness, 
feasibility and system performance. 
• XML-Based Solutions 
[36] proposes a draft of data integrity solution in the active web intermediaries 
environment. It uses XML instructions with the transferred data, which is closely 
related to our proposed solution of data integrity problem. [20] proposes a 
XML-based Data Integrity Service Model to define its data integrity solution 
formally. However, both of these solutions are only at the preliminary stages. 
Their contribution is more on the formal definition of the integrity problem in 
active web intermediaries and on the suggestion of research direction rather than 
to give a complete solution to the problem. Furthermore, just like the VPCN 
situation, none of the two proposals is implemented to verify their feasibility, 
correctness and completeness. 
In view of the above discussion, we can conclude that it is important to put forward a 
feasible framework for data integrity in active web intermediary environment.
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Chapter 3 
The Data-Integrity Message 
Exchange Model 
In this chapter, we will give an intuitive explanation of our solution to the data 
integrity problem mentioned in Chapter 1. Our solution emphasizes data integrity 
from the viewpoint of message exchange. Firstly, we clarify the concept of Data 
Integrity. Then we describe the data-integrity message exchange model from which 
the necessity of a "Data Integrity Framework" becomes obvious. Finally, examples of 
such messages are given to illustrate the basic concepts. 
3.1 Data Integrity 
Traditionally, data integrity is defined as the condition where data is unchanged from 
its source and has not been accidentally or maliciously modified, altered, or destroyed. 
However, in the context of active web intermediaries, we extend this definition to "the 
preservation of data for their intended use, which includes content transformation by 
the authorized, delegated web intermediaries during the data retrieval process".  
In this thesis, we propose a technique for a client via XML and XML Digital 
Signature to ensure that what it receives is what the server intends to give. This 
includes the situation where the received message is modified by delegated, active 
web intermediaries appropriately. Note that the aim of data integrity here is to keep 
the integrity in the data transferring and content modification process but not to make 
the data secret for the client and the server. 
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We embed data in XML structures and sign it by XML digital signature to 
construct a data-integrity message. There are some examples listed in Section 3.3. It 
is obvious that strong security methods such as encryption can keep data more secure 
than data integrity can. Then why do we employ data integrity but not very strong 
traditional security methods? It stems from three aspects of considerations: 
• Value-Added Services by Active Web Intermediaries  
Once data transferred between a client and a server is encrypted, value-added 
services will no longer be possible by any web intermediaries. This reduces the 
potentials of content delivery network services. 
• Data Reusability 
Since current encryption along the network link is an end-to-end mechanism, it is 
also impossible for any encrypted data to be reused by multiple clients. This has 
great negative impact to the deployment and efficiency of proxy caching. 
• Cost-Performance 
A large proportion of data on the internet are not content sensitive. That is, there 
is no harm if the data are visible to anyone. In this case, it is not necessary to keep 
the data invisible via very strong security methods because of the high 
performance cost of the traditional encryption process. 
 
3.2 The Data-Integrity Message Exchange Model 
Data-integrity messages that we propose are transferred over HTTP. Hence, a client can be 
either a proxy or a web browser so long as it is an end point of the HTTP connection. 
And this is independent of the mode of connectivity (i.e. wireless or fixed). Note that 
while there is possibility for data transmission errors due to the poor link connectivity, 
this is outside the scope of our work here. 
Detail study shows that the data integrity problem can actually occur in both the 
 11
HTTP request and the HTTP response. Here, we mainly focus on the latter situation in 
the rest of sections because the former situation can be considered as a simple case to 
the latter one. In the HTTP request, the type of requests that should have interest in data 
integrity research is those using POST method, where a message body is included in the 
request. In comparison with the HTTP response, it should be much easier to construct a 
data-integrity message embedded in an HTTP request. There are much fewer scenarios 
for web intermediaries to provide value-added services to the request. Furthermore, the 
construction is very similar to that for a data-integrity message embedded in an HTTP 
response when a server intends to ensure that no intermediaries can modify the message 
(see Chapter 4). More importantly, there is no need to consider the reuse of the POST 
request while the feasibility of reuse of data-integrity messages embedded in HTTP 
responses is a key design consideration for both our language support in Chapter 4 and 
our system model in Chapter 6. Furthermore, a data-integrity message that we study 
here must be in "text/xml" MIME type because this is the only data type that web 
intermediary services might work on. 
Now we briefly describe the data-integrity message exchange model. There are 
six stages in the round trip of a message request. We just consider the first-time 
transfer of an object. That is, an object that a client requests is not found in web 
intermediary proxy caches and the server needs to give a response. The former three 
stages depict the situation from a client to a server and the latter three give the 
situation from the server to the client. 
1. (Pre-Stage) A server decomposes a given object such as an HTML text into several 
parts according to some considerations and specifies its intention to assign some of 
the parts to some web intermediaries for modification. Note that this is done offline 
and can be considered as the initial preparation stage.  
2. A client submits an HTTP request to the server for the object. 
3. The request reaches the server untouched. This is the assumption that we make 
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here to ease our discussion (i.e. we focus on the discussion for the HTTP 
response). 
4. The server responds with a data-integrity message over HTTP. The message 
contains the decomposed object and the server's authorization information for 
content modification. 
5. The authorized web intermediaries that are on the return path from the server to 
the client provide value-added services on the object according to the server's 
intention. They will also describe what they have done in the message, but they 
will not validate the received message. 
6. The client verifies the received data-integrity message via the specifications of 
server's authorization and active web intermediaries' traces. If any inconsistency 
between the server's authorization and the traces is found, the client will handle 
this by its local rules. Some possible actions are: discarding the content with 
errors and showing users with the content left, or re-sending the request to the 
server. 
From the overview of the data-integrity message exchange model, we find out that it 
is necessary to build a Data Integrity Framework, on which servers, clients and proxies 
can communicate just as what we describe in the overview above. In order to get such a 
Data Integrity Framework, it is necessary to follow 3 steps. Firstly, it is required to 
provide a language specification for a server to specify its intention, for an authorized 
web intermediary to understand the intention and leave its traces, and for a client as a 
formal clue to verify the message. We will introduce the language in Chapter 4 and 
Chapter 5, and give its formal schema in Appendix A. 
Secondly, we will propose a system model for the framework. Basic requirements 
and design considerations of such a system model as well as the architecture of the 
system model will be blueprinted. There are two main components of the architecture. 
One is a data-integrity modification application, which is introduced in Section 6.3.2, 
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for an authorized web intermediary to provide services. The other is a data-integrity 
verification application (see Section 6.3.3) required for a client who concerns about 
the data integrity of the received message. In our design, performance impact will be 
one of our main considerations. Section 6 follows such a routine to describe a system 
model for our Data Integrity Framework. 
Finally, in accordance with the former two steps, we will implement the model 
and measure its performance (see Section 7 and Section 8). 
3.3 Examples of Data-Integrity Messages 
Let us first start with a simple example to illustrate what might happen in the active 
network environment with web intermediaries for value-added services. Figure 3.1 
shows a sample HTML object and Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3 show the two typical 
data-integrity message examples as the object is being transferred along the return 
retrieval path. There are two parts of the object that the server would like to send to a 
client. The first part is an untouched data-integrity message as an HTTP response to 
the client. The second part is a message to be modified by a web intermediary as it is 
sent from the server to the client. 
 
Figure 3.1: An HTML Page 
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Figure 3.2: Data-Integrity Message from A Server 
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 Figure 3.3: Data-Integrity Message after the Modification by a Web Intermediary 
When the data integrity technique is applied to the object, the server might convert it 
into one shown in Box-2 of Figure 3.2. The content of the original HTML object is 
now partitioned into two parts (shown in Box-4). Its authorization intention for 
content modification is specified in Box-3. While no one is authorized to modify the 
first part, a web intermediary, proxy1.comp.nus.edu.sg might adapt the content of the 
second part with some local information. 
When the server receives the client's request for the object, it will combine the 
message body (in Box-2) with the message headers (in Box-0 and Box-1) into a 
data-integrity message shown in Figure 3.2 and send it to the client as the HTTP 
response. 
As the message passes through the proxy proxy1.comp.nus.edu.sg, this intermediary 
will take action as specified in the message. It modifies the second part of the message 
and then adds a notification to declare what it has done to the message. This is shown in 
Figure 3.3. The transformed data-integrity message that the client receives will now 
consist of the original message headers (in Box-0 and Box-1), the original server's 
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intention (in Box-3), the modified parts (in Box-4) and the added notification (in 
Box-5) as one of the web intermediaries' left traces. 
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Chapter 4 
Language Support For Data 
Integrity Framework 
In this chapter, we will first give an overview of a language definition for our Data 
Integrity Framework. The followings are the detailed descriptions of how a server can 
make use of the language to express its intention to web intermediaries for content 
modification. The formal schema of the language is given in Appendix A. 
4.1 Overview 
Our data integrity framework naturally follows the HTTP response message model to 
transfer data-integrity messages. Under this framework, a data-integrity message 
contains a data-integrity entity body so that a server can declare its authorization on a 
message, active web intermediaries can modify the message and a client can verify it. 
However, it should also be backward compatible such that a normal HTTP proxy can 
process the non-integrity part of the response without error. 
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 Figure 4.1: Message Format 
The response message may comply with the format shown in Figure 4.1 (where "+" 
denotes one or more occurrences; "*" denotes zero or more occurrences). Their details 
are as follows: 
• The status line in a data-integrity message is as the same as in a normal HTTP 
response message. The semantics of Status Codes also follows those in HTTP/1.1 
for communicating status information. For example, a 200 status code indicates that 
the client's request is successfully received and a data-integrity message is responded 
by the server. Note that in the active web intermediary environment, the status code 
might not reflect errors that occur in the network (such as the abuse of information 
by the web intermediaries). 
• Generally speaking, the message headers are consistent with those defined in 
HTTP/1.1 [26]. However, some headers might lose their original meanings due to 
the change of the operation environment from object homogeneity to heterogeneity. 
Take "Expires" as an example. This header shows the expired date of an entire 
(homogeneous) object. But now multiple proxies might do different services on 
different parts of the object. Each of the parts within the object might have its own 
unique "Expires" date. This results in ambiguity in some of the "global" header 
fields under this heterogeneous environment. As will be seen later in this section, 
we will analyze all the HTTP headers in Section 4.4.1 and propose "Part Headers" 
(in Section 4.4.2) in our language. We also need "DIAction", an extended HTTP 
response header field to indicate the intent of a data-integrity message (see 
Appendix A for details). 
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• The entity body consists of one or more "manifests", one or more "parts" and zero 
or more "notifications". They are the important components of our language. 
Manifest: A server should provide a manifest to specify its intention for 
authorizing proxies to do pre-defined services for clients (see Section 4.2). A 
manifest might also be provided by a proxy who is authorized directly or 
indirectly by the server for further task delegation (see Section 5.2). 
Part: A part is the basic unit of data content for manipulation by an intermediary. 
The one who provides a manifest should divide its object into parts, each of 
which can be manipulated and validated separately from the rest. Proxies 
should modify the content in the range of an authorized part, and a client can 
verify the message in the unit of a part. A part consists of part headers and a 
part body (see Section 4.3). 
Notification: A notification is one of the most important traces that an authorized 
proxy should provide. Its details will be illustrated in Chapter 6.3.2. 
Note that the entity body of a message body might be encoded via the methods 
indicated in "Transfer-Encoding" header fields (See [26] for details). 
Next, we will discuss how a server makes use of Manifest, Part and Headers to 
express its authorizations in this chapter. A discussion of their arrangements in an 
entity body will be given in the end of the chapter. 
4.2 Manifest 
Both a server and delegated proxies can give manifests. The elements and the 
functionalities of proxies' manifests are almost the same as the server's. We will cover 
proxies' manifests in Section 5.2 and server's manifest in this section. A manifest has 
two important functionalities. One is for a server to specify its authorizations. The 
other is to prevent its intention from being tampered. The following 2 sections focus on 
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two issues respectively. 
 
4.2.1 Authorization Information 
We have mentioned that a server should partition its object into parts and take the part 
as the authorization unit. So we use a pair of tags < PartInfo > and < /PartInfo > to 
mark up authorizations on a part. The server should identify which part it intends to 
authorize via the element "PartID" and specify its authorizations on this part. Since 
the server might authorize others to do a variety of services on the part, each 
authorization on this part is confined via a pair of tags < Permission > and < 
/Permission >. 
In an authorization, i.e., between < Permission > and < /Permission >, three 
aspects of information may be given: What action(s) can be done? Who can do the 
action(s)? With what restriction(s) should the action(s) be done? 
• Action: This element gives an authorized service. At this moment, our language 
supports four types of feasible services. However, when a new type of services is 
available, the language can be extended to support it easily. The keywords 
"Replace", "Delete", "Transform" and "Delegate" stand for the current services 
respectively. We also need a keyword for the server to express a part not in 
demands of any services. We list these keywords and their corresponding 
meanings in Table 4.1. As for their implementations, refer to Section 6.3.2
 
Action Interpretation Possible Roles
None No authorization is permitted on the part. n.a. 
Replace Replace content of the part with new content. c.o. 
Delete Cut off all the content of the part. c.o. 
Transform Give a new representation of the content of the part. p. 
Delegate Do actions or authorize others to do actions. c.o., p., a.o. 
Table 4.1: Action, Interpretation and Roles  
(n.a.: not applicable; c.o.: content owner; p.: presenter; a.o.: authorization owner) 
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• Editor: The element provides an authorized proxy. We use host name of a proxy to 
identify it. In Figure 3.2, the authorized proxy's host name is 
"proxy1.comp.nus.edu.sg", specified within "Editor" element. 
• Restricts: All the constraints should be declared here to confine this authorization. 
Usually, the constraints are related to the content's properties. For example, the 
server might limit the type, format, language or length of a new content provided by 
proxies. But for "Delegate" action, its meaning is much more than this. The 
constraints can answer at least three questions. Can a delegated proxy A authorize a 
proxy B to do services? Can the proxy A (without delegation from the server) 
authorize the proxy B to do a certain service? Can the proxy B further authorize 
others to do its authorized services? The answers of these questions are given by the 
sub-elements of the "Restricts" element, "Editor", "Action", "Depth" (See more in 
Section 5.2). 
Two elements, "PartDigestValue" in a part information and "Roles" in a permission, 
have not been introduced yet. The first element is one of the protection measures (see 
Section 4.2.2.). The element "Roles" depicts what roles an editor might play on the 
Data Integrity Framework due to their services permitted in a data integrity message. 
Note that for every role or service that a data-integrity intermediary does, there will be a 
corresponding responsibility in the data integrity framework. For example, an intermediary 
proxy uploading local information to a part needs to be responsible for its freshness and data 
validation. Now we analyze what may be changed by each of the support services and 
conclude the possible roles in the Data Integrity Framework. We also list the possible 
roles of an action in Column 3 of Table 4.1. 
• Content is changed. From the interpretations of "Replace" and "Delete", they 
modify the original content of a part. If a delegated proxy itself does "Replace" or 
"Delete" action, "Delegate" action will also change the content of the authorized part. 
In these cases, an authorized proxy will play a role of a Content Owner. 
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• Representation is changed. "Transform" action might only change the 
representation of an authorized part but not its content. Also, "Delegate" action will 
bring a new representation to a delegated part if a delegated proxy itself 
"transforms" the content of the part. In these cases, an authorized proxy will play a 
role of a Presenter. 
• Authorization is changed. Only "Delegate" action may change authorizations on a part. 
A delegated proxy becomes Authorization Owner if it authorizes others to do some 
services on its delegated part. 
 
4.2.2 Protection Measures 
Despite the clear authorization information that a server specifies in a part, it is very 
easy for a malicious web intermediary to violate the server's intention and perform its 
own services without permission. For example, a web intermediary might convert the 
English-based content of a part to Chinese automatically using some translation 
software, but the original server might not feel comfortable with the quality of 
translation. To handle this problem, we propose to digest each part of an object via a 
digest algorithm such as MD5 [38] and use "PartDigestValue" element to record the 
digest value. With its help, it is very easy to find out if a part is modified since the 
digest value of a modified part will be different from before.  
To prevent a manifest from being tampered, XML Digital Signature [23] is used to 
ensure the integrity of the manifest. The number of parts listed in a manifest should also 
be the same as that in the original object. That is, even if there is no authorization on a 
part, the server should list it with "NONE" action to keep it untouched.  
The final situation of concern is related to the cached objects and their manifests in proxy. 
It is possible for a malicious proxy to replace the object and its manifest in an HTTP response 
with different pairing/matching. To handle this situation, the object's URL should be declared 
in its manifest through the element "MessageURL". 
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4.3 Part 
A server uses < Part > and < /Part > tags to mark up a part of an object, which is defined as the 
basic entity for ownership and content manipulation. To decompose an object into parts, while 
a server might have its own rules, there are three general guidelines what are worth suggesting 
here. 
The first guideline is that each part should be independent of the other in the object. 
If dependency occurs between two parts, errors might occur. For example, a server asks 
proxies A and B to do language translation on the content of two parts a and b 
respectively. If there is content dependency between the two parts a and b, errors or at 
least inaccuracy translation might occur because separate translation might cause some 
of the original meanings to be lost.  
Furthermore, a part may be of space inconsistency. That is, a part may contain 
inconsistent sequences of bytes. Take the HTML page in Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3 as 
an example. Its beginning section and its ending section are classified as one part 
because the server intends to leave them untouched. 
Another guideline is related to malicious proxy attack. It is advisable for a server to 
mark up all the parts of an object in lest the unmarked parts might be attacked. In this 
way, the integrity of the whole object can be ensured. 
Lastly, the properties (or attributes) of a part should be specified carefully. For example, 
the content of the object in a part is also the content of the part. < Content > and < /Content > 
tags are used to mark it up and "PartID" element is used to identify a part. Most of time, it is 




Under the current HTTP definition, headers are used to describe the attributes of an 
object. One basic assumption behind is that the same attribute value can be applied to 
every single byte of the object. However, with the introduction of content 
heterogeneity by active web intermediaries, this assumption might not be valid to 
some of the headers' values. A given attribute might have different values to different 
parts of the same object. In the following sub-sections, we would like to introduce the 
concept of "homogeneous" message headers and "heterogeneous" part headers for an 
object and define the relationship between them. 
 
4.4.1 Message Headers 
A message header is an HTTP header which describes a property of a whole object and 
its value will not be affected by any intermediary's value-added services to individual 
parts of the object. That is, the attribute can be applied to all parts of an object. Through 
the analysis of the current HTTP headers of a response, we observe that there are two 
basic types of message headers. 
• Message Generation Information 
This type of headers is related to the general property of an object. "Server" and 
"Date" headers describe message generated software and its generation date 
respectively. 
• Message Transfer Information 
This type is related to the response transfer of a web object. "Connection", "Trailer", 
"Transfer-Encoding", "Upgrade", "Via", "Accept-Ranges", "Location", 
"Proxy-Authenticate", "Retry-After", "WWW-Authenticate" and "DIAction" 
headers are all related to the message transfer. 
 
4.4.2 Part Headers 
A part header is the one that describes a property of a part, defined by the tag pair < 
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Part > and < /Part >. These headers are specified in the "Headers" element. Also, we 
call the line starting with < Headers > tag and ending with < /Headers > tag as a header 
line. 
The following HTTP headers describe properties of an entity body and take them as 
part headers when they may have different values for different parts. 
• Representation of Object 
"Content-Encoding", "Content-Language", "Content-Length" and "ContentType" 
headers describe an object's representation. Due to some services on the object, the 
encoding, the language and the type of different parts of the object are different. 
• Cacheability of Object 
"Cache-Control", "Pragma", "Age", "ETag", "Vary", "Expires" and "LastModified" are 
used to control cacheability of the object in the entity body. Because of the 
heterogeneity of the object, different parts of the object might have different 
cacheability. 
• Others (Currently Existent) 
Some of currently-defined warn-codes in "Warning" header might be not suitable 
for a whole message. For example, in HTTP/1.1, the "214 Transformation applied" 
warning added by the proxy means that a proxy transforms the object in the entity 
body. But now a proxy might transform only one part of the object that it is 
responsible for, this warn-code is no longer suitable in this case. 
In some cases, "Allow" header might not be fit for a heterogeneous object. For 
example, if a proxy provides new content for a part of the object, the valid methods 
associated with the new content resource may be different from the other parts. 
In a heterogeneous object, different parts might be accessible from different 
locations that are separated from the requested resource's URI. So 
"Content-Location" header has several values in such a case. 
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Also, because of services on the object, a server might not know the exact digest 
value and content-range of the object transferring from it to a client. So 
"Content-MD5" and "Content-Range" fall in this class. 
Note that while we classify "Content-Length" into the part header class, it is also 
used for the receivers to recognize the end of the transmission. So it is related to 
Message Transfer, which is fallen into the message header class. This actually hints to 
us that with content adaptation, mechanisms that are useful before might no longer be 
valid. In this particular case, we use the other two methods of HTTP to find out the 
end of the message. They are chunked transfer coding provided under HTTP/1.1 or 
close connection from the server side under HTTP/1.0. 
On top of the current HTTP headers, there are four new headers that we introduce 
for a part. They are "Content-Owner", "Presenter", "Authorization-Owner", and 
"URL". The first three headers record who does services on the part. A data-integrity 
intermediary should specify its host name in these headers if it plays the corre-
sponding roles. In Figure 3.3, proxy1.nus.edu.sg does "Replace" action and specifies 
itself in the "Content-Owner" header. The "URL" header locates the part. These four 
headers might be very useful to cache the part and validate it in the near future. 
Note that when data-integrity intermediaries alter any property of an authorized part, 
it should modify the corresponding part headers so that the part headers can reflect 
the real properties of the current version of the part (see Section 6.3.2). 
 
4.4.3 Relationship of Message Headers and Part Headers 
There is one intrinsic relationship between these two types of headers. Whenever an 
attribute of a part is described by both the message header and the part header at the 
same time, the latter one will override the former one. That is, the message header 
will lose its effect in this situation. This is to give flexibility in the actual 
implementation of the system architecture and the application deployment. Note that 
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headers specified in one part do not affect the properties of the other sibling parts. 
Table 4.2 lists the message and part headers that are derived from the HTTP 
headers, together with the new part headers introduced. There are two headers worth 
mentioning here. For "Content-MD5" header, it is unnecessary to be a part header 
because each part's digest value has to be included in the manifest (see Section 4.2.2). 
Furthermore, although we mention that the "Content-Type" of a data-integrity 
message should be "text/xml" in Section 3.2, we allow other "text" MIME types for 
its parts such as "text/html" and "text/plain". 
 









































Table 4.2: Message and Part Headers from HTTP Headers and New Part Headers 
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4.5 Language Component Arrangements 
With all the basic components of the language defined in the last few sections, the last 
consideration for the language is the sequencing structure of the components. This is a 
key consideration for any network based application because data is actually streamed 
from a server to a client in a chunk-by-chunk manner. Once a data chunk is received 
by an intermediary, it will be forwarded to the next network level without waiting for 
the following data chunks to arrive. Any buffering of the streaming data in an 
intermediary proxy will have direct impact to the system performance (e.g. perceived 
time) and stability. 
The basic ordering of components in the entity body of our language is shown in 
Figure 4.1. The manifest is put in the front of a data-integrity object. With the 
manifest, data-integrity intermediaries will know its tasks and can forward the 
manifest so as not to stop the streaming data transfer of the object. What if a manifest 
is put in any other position of the object? Say, put it after the part body. The proxies 
have to buffer the part body before they know if it is an authorized part from the 
manifest for them to perform tasks. Obviously, performance loss will occur in this 
case and the loss will increase with the more rear position of the manifest. 
We put part header information in the front of each part. Two aspects of 
considerations contribute to this decision. Proxies need these properties of a part to 
perform caching and other value-added services. Putting them in the front instead of 
at the rear end can avoid data buffering and stalling of the streaming data. However, it 
is not advisable to push the part headers earlier to beginning of the object. When an 
authorized proxy does services on a part, it should modify some part headers to 
reflect the corresponding properties of the part. If the part headers are much more 
ahead, the authorized proxies cannot start transferring the part headers until it 
modifies them. This burdens the proxy with data buffering from the beginning of the 
part header information. 
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Chapter 5 
Traces  of  Proxies  
In this chapter, we first analyze what traces are required to be left by proxies. To 
satisfy the requirement of trace leaving, what other components should be supported 
in our language? We list and illustrate them one by one. In the end, we will combine 
this chapter and Chapter 4 to analyze the correctness of our data integrity framework. 
5.1 Traces Leaving Requirement 
There are three requirements to leave traces. First, since a proxy might change the 
properties of a part during its services, it should provide correct property description to the 
modified part. Second, in order for the client and the server to know that the proxy does 
the services, the proxy should leave a trace to declare itself. Finally, a proxy should 
publish its intention to make not only other proxies authorized by it but also the server 
and the client know the authorizations. In response to these requirements, a proxy should 
provide part headers, notifications or its manifests in different cases. Part headers here 
are consistent with those in Section 4.4.2. As for its usage, we will illustrate it in 
Section 6.3.2.2. In this chapter, we mainly introduce the other two traces.
5.2 Data-Integrity Intermediary's Manifest 
We introduce a data-integrity intermediary's manifest, an interesting component of our 
language for Data Integrity Framework. With the introduction, we can then answer if 
there are differences between the information extracted from a server's manifest and 
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that from delegated proxies' manifests. 
A delegated proxy's manifest plays the same role as a server's manifest. That is, it 
will provide authorizations clearly and safely. So the manifest also consists of 
authorization information and protection measures. 
But there are two main differences between a server's manifest and a delegated proxy's 
manifest. 
• Authorization Information: The delegated proxy's manifest provides 
authorization information on one part of an object while the server's manifest 
provides that on the object. So what the "MessageURL" element gives out is the 
URL of the authorized part but not the object. Although "< PartInfo >" and "< 
/PartInfo>" mark up the sub-parts of the authorized part, all the authorization 
information inside should be the same. However, we should give more description 
on information given via the "PartID" element. We can tell the relationship of the 
two parts via it. A sub-part will get an ID with a suffix ".x" of the ID of the part and 
"x" stands for the sub-part's number in the part. It is worth noting a part whose ID 
has a ".0" suffix. In this case, the proxy does not partition its authorized part and 
authorizes the whole of the part. 
• Protection Measures: It is necessary to specify who authorizes the proxy to 
provide such a manifest in the "ParentManifestDigestValue" element as an 
additional but important protection measure for the delegated proxy's manifest. But 
the element "PartDigestValue" for each sub-part might be omitted. Since the 
proxy's manifest is generated on-the-fly and should be sent out from the proxy as 
early as possible (based on the same reason as the server's manifest mentioned in 
Section 4.5), we put off the job of counting digest value of each sub-part, which has 
to wait for finding the sub-parts, and puts them in the notification of the proxy. That 
is, the proxy should provide both a manifest and a notification if each sub-part's 
digest value should be specified. Of course, the proxy need not give a notification if 
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it just delegates the authorized part identified by the suffix ".0". 
Based on the differences between these two kinds of manifests, we can conclude 
that information necessary to be extracted from a delegated proxy's manifest is the 
same as, if not less than, that from a server's manifest. 
To facilitate our later descriptions, some names should be introduced here. Since 
the "Delegate" action can be authorized nested (i.e., server delegates a part to a proxy, 
the proxy delegates the part to another proxy and so on), a proxy might provide a 
manifest due to another proxy's authorization. So we call the proxy or the server 
delegate another proxy as "delegator" and the delegated proxy as "delegatee", and their 
manifests as "parent manifest" and "child manifest" respectively. Plus, we can take an 
object and its parts as a part and its sub-parts. 
Note that these names are relative to each other. A proxy can be both "delegator" 
and "delegatee", its manifest can be "parent manifest" and "child manifest", and also its 
authorized part can be "part" and "sub-part". Moreover, they have "one-to-many" 
relationship. For example, a delegator might have many delegatees but a delegatee only 
has one delegator.  
So the differences between server's manifest and delegated proxy's manifest can be 
expressed, in a more general way, as the differences between a parent manifest and its 
child manifest. 
5.3 Notif icat ion 
Figure 3.3 shows a notification. There are four considerations that the proxy should 
specify such a notification. Firstly, by means of the element "ManifestDigestValue", 
the client can know which manifest authorizes a proxy to do the action declared in the 
notification. Secondly, the elements of "Editor", "Action" and "PartID" can answer if 
the three "W"s are consistent with the manifest: Who does What action on Which part. 
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Thirdly, to assure that the part received by the client is just what the proxy puts into the 
message, the proxy fills in "PartDigestValue" with the digest value of the part. Finally, 
in order to prove the notification is from the proxy, the proxy should sign the 
notification just as the server signs its manifest. 
Besides the components introduced above, a notification might include a 
"InputDigestValue" element and a "PartDigestValues" element. In order to assure that 
the authorized part received by the proxy that does "Transform" action is not tampered 
by malicious intermediaries, the proxy should put the digest value of the part before 
transformation into the "InputDigestValue" element. The element "PartDigestValues" is 
for the proxy who does the "Delegate" action with partitioning the part into sub-parts. 
This element is supposed to record each sub-part's digest value. 
We append a notification to the end of the message for delivery. It is an obvious 
and also efficient way: 
• Putting all the notifications at the end of the message will not cause any process 
delay. Proxies do actions independently of the notifications. They only rely on the 
guide information listed in the manifest. 
• It preserves the order of the notification list. By appending a notification to the 
end, all the notifications are stored as a list. So it is easier for the client to find out 
all the notifications related to one part in order, without the need to sort these 
notifications. It will reduce the message verification time. 
• If we choose to append notification at the end of each part, the notification 
generation will be much more time critical. Proxies must generate a notification 
when they are doing the actions. If a proxy needs to process many messages 
simultaneously, the pipeline would be stalled for the proxy will wait for the result 
from the notification generation and insert the notification in front of the next 
part. 
• For client verification, it is better to put notifications just after each part. But 
 33
when the first three reasons are taken into consideration, which could heavily 
impact the performance more, we prefer to append the notifications at the end of 
the message. 
5.4 Correctness of Data Integrity Framework 
Now we analyze if our data integrity framework can assure the integrity of data in 
question. That is, can a client detect the abnormal of the received message with the 
help of our data integrity framework? 
• Whole Message Alteration  
A client receives a message that is not in accordance with its request at all. For 
example, a client requests page1, while a proxy gives it page2 with page2's 
manifest. The client can detect it via the "MessageURL" element in the 
corresponding manifest. 
• Manifest Alteration  
It is possible for a proxy to modify and even kick off the manifests of a message. 
The client can check the integrity of the manifests through verifying the digital 
signature on the manifests. If a client receives a message without a manifest, the 
client might doubt the message and decide not to accept it. 
• Notification Alteration  
It is also possible for a proxy to alter a notification list. For example, a proxy 
modifies a notification of another proxy. In our model, a proxy MUST sign the 
notification. So a client can know if others have modified the notification from the 
digital signature. 
• Message Body Alteration  
If a proxy commits wrongdoing to the message body, the client can easily find it out 
by checking the manifests and the notification list. For example, some adversary 
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does what it is not authorized to do with or without attaching a notification. If it 
attaches its notification, by checking the manifests, we can find it is the 
unauthorized proxy; if no notification is attached, by comparing the digest value 
of the part with the "PartDigestValue" element in the corresponding manifest, the 




In this chapter, we propose a system model for Data Integrity Framework. Section 6.1 
describes the basic requirements of the framework. To meet these requirements, we 
point out the design considerations and our decisions in Section 6.2. Section 6.3 shows 
the system architecture module by module. Finally, the qualitative analysis of the 
performance of our system model is given in Section 6.4. 
6.1 Basic Requirements 
In order to prove the feasibility of our framework, we build a system model. Although 
it can be concluded that our Data Integrity Framework assures clients to get correct 
value-added services (Section 5.4), it should not increase clients waiting time 
significantly, consumes much more network resources in order to ensure data integrity. 
Therefore, our system should meet the requirements as follows. 
• Minimal Perceived Time  
Latency is a main reason to prevent clients from surfing on the Internet. More 
importantly, when proxies perform some services on a message, they may delay 
message transmission. Therefore, it is very necessary for our system to reduce 
perceived time of clients as much as possible. 
• Minimal Required Bandwidth 
Bandwidth is always scarce and expensive. Our data integrity framework increases 
the message size due to the inclusion of server's intention and proxies' traces, and 
therefore increases the bandwidth requirement. Thus it is more critical for our 
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system to minimize the bandwidth requirement. 
6.2 Design Considerations and Decisions 
In this section, we give design considerations and our decisions on the system model, which 
mainly stem from its requirements. 
• Off-line Intention Generation  
In order to reduce origin server's load and its response time, our system requires the 
server to generate its manifests in advance. 
• Streaming Transmission 
We want to avoid stalling the message streaming transmission so as not to affect 
client's perceived time. Therefore, besides off-line intention generation, proxies 
should forward the ready packages immediately after they perform services on the 
message. 
• No Verification On-the-fly  
Due to the above considerations, we do not perform proxy verification in as way 
similar to manifest verification. Firstly, from the view of the client, proxy 
verification brings nothing but longer response time. On one hand, if a proxy does 
verification and there is something wrong with the message, it will go on delivering 
the message with a warning. However, since the client will only rely on itself, it 
will cost the client the same time to do verification (Section 6.3.3) as usual. On the 
other hand, if all the proxies on the path will verify the message but there is nothing 
wrong, it will cost the client some extra time to get the message. Secondly, in the 
sight of proxies, proxy verification does just very little good to them. It is to save 
proxies' resources to cache a message to be refused by the client and also to avoid 
using the cached one. But these benefits are diminished due to at least two reasons. 
One is that the cached message will not always be there because of the cache 
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replacement algorithm. The other is that the cached message might not be served to 
others. The cached message might be replaced by a new and probably correct 
response because the client will send a request for the message with a "no-cache" 
header, which passes through the proxy again. 
• Data Reuse 
Data reuse is an important way to reduce load of the origin server. It also reduces 
network latency and bandwidth requirement. From these considerations, we design 
a data-integrity message cacheable and improve its reusability by its part reusability. 
That is, some parts can be reused while others cannot. 
6.3 System Architecture 
Our system architecture consists of the components shown in Figure 6.1. The 
description of the modules of each component is depicted as follows. 
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 6.3.1 Message Generating Module 
When a server receives a request for a web message, it generates the HTTP response 
message header and transfers the header followed by the data-integrity message body 
(Chapter 4). 
 
6.3.2 Data-Integrity Modification Application 
Data-integrity modification application consists of Scanning, Modifying, Notification 
Generating, Manifest Generating and Delivering modules. If some errors occur in 
some module, we call them "application errors", which the proxy should specify them 
in the Warning header of parts where errors happen. 
6.3.2.1 Scanning Module 
In order for a proxy to recognize a data-integrity message, to look for authorizations and 
to find the authorized part, this module performs three different scans.
• Header Scanning: When a data-integrity proxy receives HTTP headers of a 
response, it can know from the DIAction header whether it is a data-integrity 
response message. If no DIAction header is there, the proxy will forward and 
cache the message as usual. 
• Manifest Scanning: The proxy parses manifests while extracting important 
information. If there is no authorization to the proxy, the package and all its 
subsequent ones will be ready for delivery to the next level. 
• Authorized Part Scanning: The proxy locates the parts by "PartID" element (See 
Section 4.2 and Section 4.3 for "PartID"). There are two cases that the package is 
ready for delivery. Firstly, the authorized part is not in this package. Secondly, the 
proxy has finished what it supposes to do on all the parts of the object, and it is 
time for it to deliver the package to its subsequent network levels. 
When a manifest streams in and out a data-integrity modification application, an 
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authorized data-integrity intermediary will record important information of a manifest 
as it parses it. This policy has two advantages. Firstly, when a manifest might fall into 
two successive data chunk packages, the first package can be forwarded to the client 
without any delay. This is to lower the performance impact when compared to 
another policy that the extract procedure should not start before getting the whole 
manifest. Secondly, it is efficient for a proxy to do actions and generate notifications 
according to the extracted information in parallel, without the need to wait for the 
whole manifest to come first. 
 
 Do Actions Generate Notifications 
Digest Value of The Manifest N Y 
ID of A Part Y Y 
Action Y Y 
Restrictions Y Y 
Roles Y Y 
Table 6.1: Important Information Extracted from A Manifest 
What then should be extracted from a manifest? Generally speaking, the extracted 
information should be a good assistance for a proxy both to do actions and to generate 
notifications (see Table 6.1). 
The Part's ID, Action, Restrictions let the proxy know what it should do. When 
generating a notification, the proxy should include these information in the notification 
as declaration about what it has done. It is also necessary to record the manifest's digest 
value and put it in the notification. It is a convincing evidence to prove the strong tie 
between the notification and the manifest (see more in Section 5.3). But why other 
information in a manifest need not be extracted? It is mainly because they function as 
proofs of the validity of a manifest and we do not employ manifest verification in a 
data-integrity proxy. 
"Delegate" action will enrich manifest scanning. A data-integrity intermediary 
should search for not only server's manifest but only delegated proxies' manifests to 
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check if it is authorized. If it gets some authority from a delegated proxy's manifest, it 
should extract some information from the manifest (see Section 5.2). Of course, it will 
also record the server's manifest as mentioned before if it also gets some authority 
directly from the server (see Section 4.2). Furthermore, the proxy also should call the 
"Manifest Generating Module" (Section 6.3.2.4) to generate its own manifest on-the-fly 
if it is authorized to do "Delegate" action and it intends to authorize others to perform 
some services. When the proxy determines to authorize others, it will do the same thing, 
but under constraints specified by the server, to the authorized part as the server treats its 
object. It will partition the part into subparts and generate a manifest to authorize others 
with its sub-parts (as is mentioned in Chapter 4).  
When the authorized part is located, the scanning module can either call its own 
"Modifying Module" or asks the help from a remote call-out server. In the latter case, 
the remote call-out server will perform the necessary content transformation functions 
and then send the result back to the proxy. Note that modifying the content locally or 
remotely on the part should not make any different to the result. 
6.3.2.2 Modifying Module 
After a proxy finds out what it should perform on a part, it will determine whether it 
should accept the tasks based on its local rules. For a part authorized to the proxy and 
accepted by the proxy, when the proxy finds that part, the defined service will be 
performed through two steps: 1) to modify the headers of the part; and 2) to do the 
authorized action. Since each step has its own features, we describe what the 
framework should do in each step to fulfill the predefined service. 
Modifying the Headers of the Part 
Just as is discussed in Section 4.4.2, it is necessary for header lines of the part to 
conform to the part's properties. To realize this, we should perform different tasks to 
the header lines according to the definition of the actions: 
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• Delete: The proxy deletes the entire original header lines of the part because they 
already lose their original meaning. It then gives a new header line with only one 
property "Content-Owner" that contains its host name. Although the part is empty, 
it will be easier for the client to identify who does the action by means of 
"Content-Owner" and to tell if it does legally by checking its notification and 
manifests. 
• Replace: Here we use a "substitute" content to replace the original content. With 
the same reason as "Delete", the proxy should replace the header lines of the part 
with a new header containing at least the following properties: 
Content-Owner: its host name; 
URL: where or how the substitute can be found in the proxy; 
Last-Modified: the date that the substitute is last modified;  
Expires: the date that the substitute expires. 
• Transform: Under this action, the proxy should not change the original header 
lines but should append a new header line to the transformed content. Originally, 
there might be three kinds of header lines. The first kind is used to describe the 
content properties. Since the original content is not changed, it is necessary to keep 
it there. The second kind is probably related to the authorization on the part (see the 
next item "Delegate"). The proxy also cannot modify these header lines because its 
action will not change the authorization on the part. The rest (if any) of the header 
lines are left by the other proxies that have performed "Transform" actions on the 
part. To meet a client's demand, a proxy might be authorized to perform 
"Transform" actions that are different from those done by other proxies on the same 
part. Hence, the proxy should keep these header lines to indicate the combined 
"Transform" action done by it and other proxies to produce the final presentation of 
the part. 
The new header line should contain at least "Presenter", "URL" and 
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"Last-Modified" header fields to describe the new representation of the part. Since 
we assume that the representation should expire at the same time as its content does, 
the proxy need not specify the "Expires" header field. The "Expires" property of 
the representation should be implicitly equal to the one specified in the original 
header lines for the content. 
• Delegate: The proxy should keep the original header lines and add a new header 
line with one new property "Authorization-Owner" to indicate its authorization on 
this part. 
All in all, a part can have at most three kinds of header lines at any time. And this 
happens when at least one "Delegate" or "Transform" action is done on the part. 
 
Do the Authorized Action on the Part 
• Delete: The proxy just removes the content of the part. For example, the proxy A 
deletes the part j, so the part is changed to:  
<Part> 




We still keep the "PartID" element because of the following consideration. A part 
is authorized with two possible permissions, one is "Delete" and the other is 
"Replace". In case where if a proxy deletes everything in the part (including the 
"PartID"), other proxies will not be able to do the "Replace" action on the part 
with the new content because the part location is now missing. 
• Replace: The proxy replaces data marked between "<Content>" and "< 
/Content>" tags in the part with new data according to its local rules. 
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• Transform: The proxy gives a new representation for content between the 
"<Content>" and "< /Content>" tags. Note that the data buffering requirement for 
content transformation is dependent on the transformation algorithm of interest. 
For example, for context language translation, we usually need to buffer the entire 
content of the part that might be transmitted across multiple data chunks before 
the action takes place. In contrast, it is not necessary to buffer data if we only 
perform action character by character such as encoding. 
• Delegate: The proxy appends its manifest to the (primary) manifests of the object. 
Of course, this action should be done before the proxy starts searching for the 
authorized parts. That is, after the proxy scans through the last manifest of an 
object, it will insert its manifest between the last manifest and the first part. 
Besides appending its manifest, the proxy should do one the following things. 
1.  Divide the part into several sub-parts: 
In this case, the proxy treats the content of the part just as the server treats the 
content of the object. So a nested structure should be expected. We will give 
an example in Figure 6.2 below to illustrate this concept. 
2.  Indicate that it authorizes the part: 
As mentioned in Section 6.3.2.1, the proxy is unlikely to partition a part into 
sub-parts as authorization unit but will authorize the whole part to others. To 
indicate this, the proxy just needs to append an ".0" to the ID of the part to 
declare its intention. 
We mentioned in Section 6.2 that our system model can keep up with the 
streaming data transmission to a great extent. But how can this be done? To answer 
this question, we will elaborate on the details of how a proxy handles the streaming 




Figure 6.2: A Part and Its Sub-parts 
The header field of a part needs to be ready for delivery before any action can be 
taken on the part. Since the proxy collects all the information of the part and has 
already decided what to do, it will be easy for the proxy to modify the header fields of 
the part. For example, when the proxy is going to replace content of a part with the 
content of a file, it will specify the "URL" header with the address of the file, 
"Last-Modified" header with the last modified date of the file, "Expires" header with 
the expired date of the file, and so on. 
For replacement or deletion, it is possible for the proxy to do action in parallel 
with the delivery of some packets, since such action can be done without the need to 
consider the original part. The proxy only needs to put the new content in the part, 
write it back to a packet, and deliver it. It then reads the subsequent packets into its 
buffer until it gets another part. Afterwards, it will clean up all the data of the part 
from its buffer. 
For transformation, a proxy might also perform parallel actions of doing the action 
and delivering packets in some situations. For example, a proxy is required to transform 
traditional Chinese characters to simple Chinese characters on the streaming data. Since 
this is a character-to-character transformation, each transformed character is ready for 
delivery. However, if the transformation needs the content of the whole part as the 
input (such as language translation from Chinese to English), the proxy should buffer 
all the packets containing the part first before it performs the transformation. 
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For delegation, after a proxy appends its manifest, it will stream the message. 
There is no other thing needed to be done on the message but to append its 
notification to the end of the message. 
During the actions, a notification generating process can be started. But when 
should be the good time to call the Notification Generating Module? Since all the 
information are ready after scanning the corresponding manifest except the digest 
value of the part, the time to call the module should be at the beginning of counting 
the digest value. But for different actions, the time to start the notification generation 
process (i.e. to do the digest) can be different. 
For deletion, since the input of doing digest comprises only the ID of the part, the 
proxy can start doing digest when it finds out the ID of the part. 
For replacement, it can get the digest value from the ID of the part and the new 
content. Thus, once the proxy finds out the ID of the part and knows the content, it 
can start doing the digest. 
For transformation, it is necessary to do digest twice. Firstly, the part's ID and the 
content with an original representation comprise the data for digest. Secondly, the 
proxy does digest on the part's ID and the content with a new representation. So the 
proxy will wait for the input and the output of the transformation before it can start 
doing digest. 
For delegation, there are two cases to do digest. If the proxy does not partition the 
part, the new ID of the part and the original content are the data for digest. On the other 
hand, if it partitions the part into several sub-parts, it should count each sub-part's 
digest value with the sub-part's ID and content. So the proxy can start doing digest only 
when it gets all the necessary information.
6.3.2.3 Notification Generating Module 
When it is time to count the digest value of a modified part, the process comes to this 
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module. After the digest value is obtained, it will also generate a notification (as the 
one described in Section 5.3) to declare what the proxy has done. 
6.3.2.4 Manifest Generating Module 
When the proxy intends to give a child manifest, this module will be called to 
generate a manifest as illustrated in Section 5.2. The manifest will be put in the end of 
all the manifests by now. 
6.3.2.5 Delivering Module 
The proxy delivers all the ready packages. If it is time to deliver the last package, it 
appends the generated notifications (if any) to the last package and delivers it. 
 
6.3.3 Data-Integrity Verification Application 
One important feature of our Data Integrity Framework is that a client can verify what 
it receives is what the server intends to give to it. If the client wants to verify 
data-integrity responses, it should employ a data-integrity verification application. Of 
course, the client can choose not to install the application and treat a data-integrity 
response as a normal response. 
Data-Integrity Verification Application has one module, Authenticating Module. 
It consists of the functions as follows. 
• Data-integrity responses differentiation: The application can differentiate data-
integrity responses with other responses via "DIAction" header field of the response. 
Furthermore, it does not affect the process of other responses. 
• Certificate authentication: To verify that a server's manifest is signed by the 
server, or some proxy's manifest and notification are signed by the proxy, we need 
its real public key. To check the authenticity of the public key in its certificate as 
one of the elements of XML Digital Signature, the application will verify the 
certificate authority (CA) locally or remotely that provides the trustworthy 
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certificate. This method is a typical public key verification [42]. 
• Manifest authentication: The digital signature on a manifest can be verified with the 
help of its public key so that it is easy to find out if the manifest from a server or 
from some delegated proxies is modified or replaced by malicious intermediaries 
during the transmission. It also checks if a delegatee gives a child manifest within 
its authority. 
• Declaration authentication: In order to verify that a proxy declares to do what it is 
authorized to do on a part, the application goes through the following steps: 
1. via "PartID" and "Editor" elements of a notification, it is easy to find the 
notifications of the proxy on the part. 
2. Get all the authorizations on the part to the proxy from the manifests declared 
via the "ManifestDigestValue" element of these notifications. 
3. Match what the proxy declares to do with the authorizations gotten in the last 
step. 
• Part authentication: The application can make known the authenticity of the 
received part after it knows who finally touches the part with what kinds of action. 
Through the proxy's host name in the last header line of a part, the corresponding 
notification can then be found easily. As for "Delete" or "Replace" action, the 
received one is authentic if its digest value is the same as the one declared in the 
notification. It is a nested procedure to verify a part on which the final action is 
"Transform". Besides verifying the digest values of the counted and the declared, 
the application should verify the input of the transformation. It can identify who 
touches the part before the proxy transforms it via the host name in the header line 
in front of the last and "InputDigestValue" element of the notification and verifies if 
the input is provided by the server or a verified proxy. For "Delegate" action, the 
part without sub-parts is authentic if its digest value matches the one in the 
notification. The part with sub-parts is authentic if all its sub-parts are authentic. 
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6.4 Analysis of System Model 
In accordance with basic requirements presented in Section 6.1, the qualitative analysis 
of performances is listed here and their quantitative analysis will be given in Chapter 8. 
• Minimal Client's Perceived Time 
Our system model minimizes the client's perceived time with the following strategies. 
Firstly, a server provides its manifest off-line. Secondly, a proxy does not verify 
what it receives and does its best to overlap its services with the streaming 
transmission of the message. Finally, clients can get response much faster since our 
model makes full use of cacheability of an object via allowing independent 
cacheability of each part of the object. 
• Minimal Bandwidth Requirement  
Although server's manifests and proxies' traces increase the amount of transferred 
data, the extra bandwidth requirement over the server-proxy link can be reduced 
through the reuse of manifests. That is, proxies can do services for a variety of 
clients in accordance with the cached, not expired manifests so that the server 




In this chapter, we will describe how we implement the Data Integrity Framework in a 
fully functional system in details. Note that we assume that a server only needs to 
respond with a data-integrity message. It is not our focus on how a server generates the 
message, either by a program automatically or manually by hand. Thus, we will only 
give our detailed implementation of proxy and client. That is, based on our proposal in 
the previous chapters, how do we entitle proxies with modification functionality and 
how do we provide clients with verification functionality? 
7.1 Background 
We modify Squid [3] so that it can do proxy-related services on a data-integrity message and 
modify Netscape Plug-in [4] so that it can verify the data-integrity message for clients. 
In this section, we describe their basic implementation and illustrate our modification 
on them in details in Section 7.2 and Section 7.3.
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Figure 7.1: Basic Components of Squid 
7.1.1 Overview of Squid Implementation  
7.1.1.1 Basic Components of Squid 
There are 3 main components of Squid: client-side, server-side and storage manager. 
(See Figure 7.1) 
Client-Side: This is where new requests are accepted, parsed and processed and 
responses are forwarded to downstream proxies or clients. This module de-
termines if the request is a cache hit or miss. 
Server-Side: These routines are responsible for forwarding the cache miss requests to 
the origin server. Various protocols (e.g. HTTP, FTP, Gopher) should be 
supported. In particular, the HTTP module is designed to handle exclusively HTTP 
requests. It sets up the TCP connection to upstream proxies or the origin server, builds 
a request buffer and submits it for writing on the socket, and registers a read 
handler to receive and process the HTTP response. 
Storage Manager: This is the glue between the client- and server- sides. Every object 
saved in the cache is allocated a StoreEntry data structure. A client-side request 
registers itself with a StoreEntry to be notified when new data arrive in the 
StoreEntry. Server-side response appends ready data to the StoreEntry. 
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 With Figure 7.2, we now illustrate the workflow of an HTTP response for a cache 
miss request in Squid. In this illustration, we focus on how the server-side works because 
we implement a data-integrity intermediary mainly based on the functions in the 
server-side. 
7.1.1.2 Flow of A Typical Response 
1. On the client-side, a new StoreEntry is allocated and the client is registered with it. 
The server-side then allocates an HTTPStateData data structure for the request to 
store all the important information related to the request and its reply including 
StoreEntry, and at the same time forwards the request to the original server. It also 
registers a read handler to receive and process the HTTP reply. 
2. As a response is initially received, the httpReadReply function is invoked to read 
data from the read handler package by package. It reads data until errors happen, 
connection is closed, or all the response data are received. At the beginning of the 
function, the httpProcessReplyHeader function is invoked to parse the HTTP reply 
headers and store them in the HttpReply structure of the HttpStateData. As a package 
of reply data is read, it is appended to the StoreEntry of the HttpStateData via the 
storeAppend function. Every time a data package is appended to the StoreEntry, the 
client-side is notified of the new data via a callback function. 
3. As the client-side is notified of a new data package, it copies the data from the 
StoreEntry into a data buffer, processes the data, and then writes the processed 
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data on the client socket. 
4. Via the httpPconnTransferDone function invoked by httpReadReply, the 
server-side can find out if it finishes reading the reply from the upstream server or 
by which method it can tell the completion of its work. 
5. When the server-side finishes reading the reply, it marks the StoreEntry as 
"complete" by updating the store-status of the StoreEntry from STOREPENDING 
to STORE-OK. It also unregisters itself from the HttpStateData and either waits 
for another reply from the server, or for the server connection closed by the 
upstream server. 
6. When the client-side has written all of the object data, it unregisters itself from the 
StoreEntry. At the same time, it either waits for another request from the client, or 
closes the client connection. 
 
7.1.2 Overview of Netscape Plug-ins Implementation 
Netscape Plug-in provides the APIs mainly as follow. (See Figure 7.3) 
1. Initialization and Shut-down 
When Netscape is started, plug-ins are loaded. By NPP_Initialize, any plugin 
specific initialization is done when they are loaded, while NPP_Shutdown is called 
when a plug-in is being unloaded to do any specific shut-down function. 
2. Creation and Destroy 
When an "EMBED" tag appears in a page, Netscape will create an instance of NPP data 
structure for the corresponding plug-in. At this time, NPP_New is called to create 
a PlugInstance-type component of the structure. All the instate state information 
about the plug-in is put into the component and so do all per-instance information 
that plug-in developers need in the routines of the plug-in. As opposed to it, if the 
instance is destroyed, NPP_Destroy is called for storing some state information if 
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this instance needs to be recreated later. 
 
3.  Window Set 
When some messages (e.g., a process message) are supposed to be shown by 
calling a plug-in, NPP_SetWindow will be called to point out where to put the 
messages. 
4. Stream 
When a "src" tag appears in the line marked by the "EMBED" tag, a stream of 
NPStream type is created by Netscape. NPP_NewStream is provided to do any 
preparation for the delivery of the data. The stream is destroyed after the 
completion of the data delivery. At this time, NPP_DestroyStream is called to 
handle the ending of the stream. After the data are read into a file, 
NPP_StreamAsFile is called so that the data can be processed via file method. 
7.2 Modification to Squid 
Our system on the proxy side is built on a freely distributed Squid proxy server system. We 
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use the 2.4.STABLE6 version. We modify some data structures and some data 
routines in Squid to realize the data-integrity modification application. 
 
7.2.1 Modification to Data Structure 
We add a new flag dif into the HttpReply structure to tell if this is a data-integrity 
response or not. We also add a new field difState, which points to a new data 
structure DifStateData, into HttpStateData. The new data structure has three kinds of 
fields and a pointer array field whose elements point to a DifStateData. We define 
these fields as follows: 
• Status  
We store some status of our processing to the reply and its associated 
modification in this kind of fields. 
manifest: It records the process of scanning for a manifest, i.e., starting to look for 
the manifest, finding the manifest but not its end, or getting the complete 
manifest. 
authorization-number: This field shows the number of authorizations already 
accepted by the proxy before finishing to scan the manifest or the number of 
authorizations not executed by the proxy yet since the beginning of the services. 
delegate-number: Similar to the authorization-number, this field traces the 
number of child manifests probably after the current manifest but before fin-
ishing to scan the manifest or the number of child manifests not scanned yet 
after the beginning to search for the child manifests. 
• Manifest 
We store some important information extracted from the current manifest as 
mentioned in 6.3.2. In accordance with the information described in that section, 
we provide two fields: authorization, which is an array of Authorization type, to 
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store authorization information and manifestdigest-value to store the manifest's 
digest value. 
• Buffer 
Because data are sent package by package, some information might appear across 
multiple packages. In this case, we need to buffer them in some of the following 
fields below. Furthermore, child manifests and notifications should be placed in 
locations as mentioned in 6.3.2, so that those early generated ones need to be 
stored for a shorter period of time. We provide a field to store them. 
tag Since all the important information is marked up via tags, we should match data 
with these tags in order to find the information we need. However, it is possible 
for a tag to be distributed in two packages and we cannot match the tag in one 
package of data. With this consideration, we use this field to store the tag and 
record which portion of the tag is in the first package. When the subsequent 
package is read, we can know if the tag is found by comparing the left portion 
of the tag and the beginning data of the second package. Also, the first package 
with the ending of the front portion of the tag can be appended to the StoreEntry 
after we record the portion in the tag field. 
Buf Whether the information stored in this field is ready for storeAppend depends 
on whether it needs to be modified. When it is ready for storeAppend, "store" 
action accounts for "copy". Otherwise, it accounts for "paste". There are 2 
pieces of information stored in this field at different times. When it is time to 
scan for a manifest, we "copy" an authorization for a part in this field if the 
authorization is distributed in two packages. The reason is that we extract the 
authorization information part by part. Moreover, we "paste" an authorized 
part into this field due to not only its distribution but also the authorized action 
on this part in accordance with Section 6.3.2. 
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manifest-notification In our implementation, child manifests and notifications 
need to be stored in different times. So we provide one buffer for both. 
• Delegate 
When we process child manifests and do actions according to them, it is necessary 
to use all of the above fields. The reason is that the operation functions (added in 
httpReadReply) on the DifStateData structure are recursively called since the 
flows of processing the parent manifest and child manifests are the same and so do 
the flows of doing actions according to them. So we employ a child field and a pointer 
array to help deal with child manifests successfully. 
7.2.2 Reply Header Processing 
In order to make sure this is a data-integrity reply, we do three modifications to routines 
in Squid. Firstly, we modify function the httpReplyParse invoked in httpProcess-
ReplyHeader to set dif when httpReplyParse finds a "DIAction" header. Secondly, after 
calling back from httpProcessReplyHeader (other modifications depicted from now on 
are all put in httpReadReply), we check HttpReply if "Content-Type" is "text/xml" and 
"Content-Length" is unknown. Finally, if all these fields show a data-integrity reply, we 
set manifest to "starting to look for the manifest". Otherwise we take the reply as a 
normal one and other modifications will not be called. 
 
7.2.3 Reply Ending 
We use the simplest way to tell the end of the reply, i.e., the close connection by server. 
When coming to the end of the reply, proxies' notifications will be appended to the 
StoreEntry before the original final tasks such as freeing the read handler are 
performed. 
We will add the following three modules all with a DifStateData as their parameter 
into httpReadReply to implement the functionality that a proxy does services on the 
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object in this reply. 
 
7.2.4 Manifest  Scanning 
When we find the beginning of a manifest, manifest is set to "finding the manifest but 
not the end". This status will be changed to "getting the complete manifest" until we 
find the end of the manifest. We also extract authorization information (if it is for the 
proxy or "Delegate" action for others) to authorization field part by part while 
scanning the manifest. authorization-number will be increased with a new value put 
into the authorization field and delegate-number will also be increased if the new 
element records "Delegate" action for others. Finally the manifest digest value will be 
extracted from  the XML Digital Signature to manifestdigest-value field. If 
delegate-number shows child manifests probably follows this parent manifest after 
we finish parsing the parent manifest, the "Manifest Scanning" module will be called 
again with an element of child, a DifStateData. 
 
7.2.5 Child Manifest Generation 
Via authorization field, the proxy can know if it should provide a child manifest and 
how the manifest is (if yes). So it will generate a child manifest as mentioned in 
Section 6.3.2 with the help of information already obtained upon scanning the parent 
manifest. It then puts the generating result in the manifest-notification field so that 
we can insert it in the front of the first part of the object when we find the part. 
 
7.2.6 Entity body Modification 
This is also a recursive function. This function is called when the proxy modifies a 
sub-part according to the parent manifest with a parent DifStateData or according to 
the child manifest with a child DifStateData. After each modification, a notification 
will be generated in the manifest-notification field. Upon finishing an authorization, 
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authorization-number will be decreased, which finally shows the proxy completion 
of all its modification work to the authorized parts. 
7.3 Modification to Netscape Plug-ins 
With the Netscape Plug-in APIs, it is convenient for us to implement our data integrity 
verification application. We just need add something into two of the APIs, 
NPP_SetWindow and NPP_StreamAsFile. Via NPP_SetWindow, we display "In 
Progress", "Error", or "No Errors" message about the on-going verification process to 
users. Since our data-integrity message has been read into a file by Netscape, we 
access the file via NPP_StreamAsFile. In this API, a function will be called to verify 




In this chapter, we will firstly describe our experiment objectives and define the 
design of our experiments. We then explain the experiment parameters used and 
describe the set-up of the experiments. Finally we present and analyze our experiment 
results. 
8.1 Experiment Objective and Design 
In the previous chapters, we presented a language support and a system model for our 
Data Integrity Framework. We also implemented a real-life system that is fully 
compliant with our proposed system model. In this chapter, we are going to design 
several sets of experiments to support our argument that our Data Integrity Framework 
incurs only very small performance overhead but brings great benefits. 
With this objective, we design two sets of experiments and contrast our Data Integrity 
Framework with HTTP and HTTPS in different cases. Our reasons for choosing them 
as contrasts are as follows: 
HTTP 
There are two main reasons why we choose HTTP as the basic reference in our 
experiments. Since our Data Integrity Framework is built on HTTP, one main 
concern is on how much extra overhead it incurs (although it enriches HTTP 
functionalities). In the active web intermediaries environment, HTTP intermediaries 
may also do actions on the transferred object according to some architecture such as 
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OPES [2] although the integrity of the object cannot be ensured. So we compare our 
Data Integrity Framework with HTTP in the active web intermediaries 
environment. 
HTTPS 
HTTPS is a superset of data integrity, so it is an alternative to ensure data integrity. 
And since proxies cannot provide services on an encrypted message, we compare 
HTTPS with our Data Integrity Framework under the situation that the server does 
not authorize anyone to modify the message. 
Our Data Integrity Framework incurs additional performance overhead (in terms 
of the time) because of the following reasons. Firstly, manifests and notifications 
increase the size of the response message. Thus, during the retrieval of a text object, 
network bandwidth requirement is higher and longer retrieval time is incurred. It also 
spends additional time to generate the notifications and the child manifests on-the-fly. 
Secondly, after the retrieval, client verification costs some time. Note that the time 
cost of performing actions in the web intermediaries should not be counted as extra 
for maintaining data integrity. It is because a data-integrity intermediary should spend 
the same amount of time to perform actions as an HTTP intermediary does. However, 
for "Delegate" action, the generation of a child manifest on-the-fly and the existence 
of the manifest contribute to the extra overhead, since an HTTP intermediary might 
do actions according to its local rules established with servers and other intermediaries in 
private. 
We design a set of experiments to quantify the extra overhead mentioned above 
under two conditions: the object is untouched and only one service is performed on 
the object. 
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8.2 Experiment Set-up 
Our experiment system consists of four components as follows. 
• Server: We use Apache server v/1.3.27 (Unix) that holds all the objects requested 
by the client and supports both HTTP requests and SSL requests for these objects. 
The Apache is run on a machine with four ultraSPARC-II 296 Mhz CPU and 4 
Gbytes RAM. 
• Proxy: It is a C program to generate a notification, since some of proxies' extra 
overhead stems from the notification generation in accordance with our analysis 
in the last section. 
• Latency: It simulates the latency due to the increase of each requested object's size 
by a manifest. 
• Client: The client consists of two C programs. One is to request objects in the 
server via HTTP and HTTPS respectively. The other is to verify the 
corresponding data-integrity objects. 
Last three components are built on a Pentium 200 MMX machine with 64 Mbytes 
of RAM and 10Mbps Ethernet. Both machines are in the same high speed network 
environment. 
8.3 Experiment Parameter 
We use "text object size" as a parameter in our experiments. In this section, we analyze 
the distribution of sizes of text objects via a trace log with 1,364,219 records from 
National Laboratory for Applied Network Research (NLANR). Among them, there are 
110,961 TCP_MISS/200/text records. Moreover, we classify the size of objects into 0-1 
packet size, 1-10 packet size, 10-20 packet size till more than 90 packet size. One 
packet size amounts to about 1.3 Kbytes. We use packet size as the basic unit because 
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the effect of object size on retrieval time depends on the amount of packets necessary to 
load the object (data are sent in packets). We show the distribution in Figure 8.1. The 
amount of packets to transfer a text object mainly falls into the range of 0-30 packets. 
Only 1 % of the text objects need more than 60 packets for its transmission. So we 
study text objects with sizes of not more than 80 Kbytes (1.3Kbytes per packet). 
According to this statistic, we take nine discrete sizes as the object sizes in our 
subsequent experiments. They are 1K, 10K, 20K,..., 80K. 
 
Figure 8.1: Distribution of Object Sizes 
8.4 Experiment Methods and Results 
In this section, we would like to study the extra performance overheads of our model 
and that of HTTPS. 
• Extra Overhead of Our Model 
According to the analysis in Section 8.1, we do the following experiments to 
measure the extra overhead of our model in contrast with HTTP. We use a 
data-integrity message with only one part. That is, we do not partition an object 
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into parts but just put its content into < Content > and < /Content > tags of the 
only part. We vary the object's size to get the extra overheads of our model: 
(a) Extra sizes due to manifests and notifications 
Our measurement shows that the signature of a manifest is about 1.5 Kbytes. 
Other information of a manifest with only one part information is about 0.35 
Kbytes. So the minimal size of a manifest can be estimated to be about 1.85 
Kbytes. Since one packet size is about 1.3 Kbytes, two extra packets for the 
message due to the manifest in our experiment should be needed. Same as a 
manifest, the minimal size of a notification is about 1.85 Kbytes. This size 
will increase with the amount of sub-parts whose digest value should be 
specified in the notification. But for the notification in our experiment, the 
message also at most takes another 2 extra packets to deliver the notification. 
(b) Time cost due to extra sizes 
Since both a manifest and a notification takes at most 2 extra packets, we just 
measure the time cost due to 2.7 Kbytes extra sizes. We use a program to 
request 9 objects with the different sizes plus 2.7 Kbytes. For example, if the 
original object size is 1 Kbytes, what we request will be of 3.7 Kbytes. At the 
same time, we use another program to record the arrival time of each packet for 
every reply. We take the time cost of the first two packets of each reply as that 
due to the extra sizes and the whole retrieval time cut off the extra time as the 
retrieval time of the original object. We request each object 100 times and take 
the average of the data we collect. The result is shown in Table 8.1. We see that 
the extra transfer time is quite constant, independent of the size of the web 
object. Furthermore, the approximated overhead of about 2000 µs should be 
small enough to be justified for the important function of data integrity. Figure 
8.2 shows the percentage of the relative percentage overhead with respect to the 
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object size. As is expected, it is larger when the object size is small. With larger 
object size, it quickly decreases and then levels off at about 2%, which is quite 
reasonable. Note that here, the measurement is the object transfer time. In the 
normal situation of web page retrieval, the perceived overhead by a client is 
much smaller due to the parallel fetching of objects within a page. 
 
Size (KBytes) 1 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 
Extra Transfer(µs) 1961 2331 2043 2031 2138 2042 2034 2027 2036
RT Without 
Extra Transfer(µs)
7761 16021 24211 32901 56116 58609 71734 87349 97431
RT With 
Extra Transfer(µs)
9722 18351 26254 34932 58253 60651 73768 89376 99467
Table 8.1: Retrieval Time With and Without 2 Extra Packets 
 
Figure 8.2: Increase Rate Due to Extra Transfer 
(c) Time cost of notification generation 
There are 2 main costs in the notification generation. It takes some time to count 
the digest value of the part for which the notification is declared for. Also, 
signing the notification costs some time. 
–  Digest Value: We use md5 function in OpenSSL [5] to do the digest. The 
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result is shown in Table 8.2. The cost of counting digest value is almost 
linearly increasing (with 0.5E-7 slope) with the size of the digest. 
Furthermore, even for objects of up to about 80 Kbytes, the digest cost is 
only about 3800 µs, which is definitely small enough to be practical. 
– Signature: We first do digest on a notification (excluding its signature) 
with the md5 function. The digest value is put in its XML Digital Signature 
structure. We then use signature function in OpenSSL [5] to get the 
signature value. It employs the SHA1 [22] digest algorithm to ensure the 
integrity of the XML Digital Signature and the 1024-bit RSA [7] private 
keys to encrypt the digest value. Since a notification without sub-parts' 
digest values (excluding its signature) is measured to be about 300 bytes, the 
cost of counting it is measured to be about 275 µs. Also, due to the fixed 
XML Digital Signature's structure, the size of what to be signed is almost a 
constant and the cost on it is measured to be about 3973 µs. Therefore, the 
overall signature's cost is about 4248 µs. 
Object Size (Kbytes) 1 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 
Digest Cost (µs) 79 501 962 1438 1898 2354 2833 3309 3816
Table 8.2: Digest Cost Time with Different Object Sizes 
 
Original Object Size 
(Kbytes) 
1 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 
Verification Time with 
No Authorization (µs) 
1779 2403 3115 3853 4589 5357 6097 6899 7726
Verification Time with 
An Authorization (µs) 
2799 3467 4253 4974 5699 6455 7240 8044 8787
Table 8.3: Verification Cost without vs. with an Authorization 
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(d) Time cost of client verification 
We use the verification program with the functionality as illustrated Section 
6.3.3 to collect the verification time with and without an authorization. The 
result is shown in Table 8.3. Here, we see that the verification time is about 
1000 µs, which again is small enough to ensure the practicability of our Data 
Integrity Framework. 
Without an authorization, 
Extra Time =  Extra Transfer Time + Client Verification Time (without an 
authorization) 
With an authorization, 
Extra Time =  2 * Extra Transfer Time (a manifest and a notification) + 
Notification Generation Time + Client Verification Time (with 
an authorization) 
 
Figure 8.3: The Whole Extra Cost Without vs. With an Authorization 
All in all, the basic costs of our model with and without an authorization are shown 
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in Figure 8.3. While the extra time overhead increases with the object size, its 
absolute value is small and should be acceptable as the cost for maintaining data 
integrity of web retrieval. And the fact of parallel object fetching in web page 
retrieval further ensures its practicability. 
• Overhead of HTTPS 
We design this set of experiments with two considerations. Since the overhead of 
HTTPS mainly stems from the handshaking and the data encryption/decryption [11], 
a large proportion of the retrieval time of an object over HTTPS is spent on these 
two procedures. Besides these, HTTPS brings another kind of latency to the 
retrieval of a web page. It can retrieve other embedded objects in a web page 
ONLY after it finishes the retrieval of the HTML container object and 
authenticates it. 
One object: We use the same program that issues HTTP requests in the "Time 
Cost Due to Extra Sizes" experiment of the above section to request the same 
objects over HTTPS. Result of object's average retrieval time is shown in 
Table 8.4. "Original Object" in the table stands for an object before encryption. 
Compared this result with those in Table 8.1 to Table 8.3, we see that the 
performance of HTTPS is far much lower than that of our Data Integrity 
Framework and System. Of course, if data can only be seen by the receiving 
end-client and need to be hidden from other people, we cannot avoid the 
HTTPS overhead. On the other hand, however, if we just want to ensure the 
integrity of the web data, such large performance overhead can be 













526871 540872 555434 568074 583840 599269 631427 616339 634373
Table 8.4: HTTPS Retrieval Time With Different Object Sizes 
Web page: We use the same NLANR log with 34,613 web pages. The additional 
delay between the ending of the HTML container retrieval and the end of the 
whole web page retrieval (taken into the consideration of the parallel object 
fetching) are shown in Figure 8.4. Note that we do not consider those web pages 
with just the HTML object only because they do not trigger any additional 
embedded object retrieval and hence, no further latency will occur. 
 
Amount of 














2 – 5 19,409 14,247 14,973 726 5.10% 
5 – 10 9,173 23,751 24,512 761 3.20% 
10 – 15 2,888 34,397 35,380 983 2.86% 
15 – 20 1,307 41,992 42,875 883 2.10% 
> 20 1,838 43,734 44,745 1,011 2.31% 
Figure 8.4: Retrieval of Other Embedded Objects Delayed After the Completed 
Retrieval of the HTML Object 
8.5 Analysis of Performance 
According to the collected data in the last section, we compare the performance of our 
model with those of HTTP and HTTPS respectively. 
• HTTP vs. Data Integrity Framework 
Figure 8.3 shows the extra overhead of our model with and without an 
authorization. We can see that the extra overhead is increasing nearly linearly 
with the original object size. However, with the size of a text object mainly 
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ranged from 0 to 80 Kbytes, the extra overhead even at 80 Kbytes is still small 
enough to be accepted for data integrity function. Of course, here we assume the 
object is not divided into parts. If it does, performance overhead will definitely be 
incurred and it should be minimized. It will be discussed in the later part of this 
section.  
Our model's performance will be affected as follows. With the increasing amount 
of parts of an object, there will be more pieces of part information in a manifest. It 
also costs more time to verify more parts. Thus the more the amount of parts, the 
more the extra overhead of our model will be. Moreover, the increase of 
authorizations incurs more extra overhead in our model due to three main reasons. 
Firstly, it not only adds the size of a manifest but also the amount of notifications. 
"Delegate" action may also increase the size of extra information transferred by 
child manifests. Secondly, it spends more time on notification generations. Finally, 
the verification time increases due to more information on demand of verification 
such as manifests, notifications and parts. 
However, these factors mean more services added on an object so that both 
servers and clients can get more benefit. It is naturally to get more services with 
higher cost. So a server should consider both benefits and extra overhead of Data 
Integrity Framework together in order to find out the balanced point to make it 
most beneficial per dollar cost. 
• HTTPS vs. Data Integrity Framework 
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Figure 8.5: The Retrieval Time of DIF and HTTPS 
We compare our model with HTTS in two aspects. One is the retrieval time and 
the other is the server's load. 
We show the retrieval time of our model without any authorization and that of 
HTTPS in Figure 8.5. Since the two sets of experiments are performed with the same 
network/system environment and with same object requests, this ensures the fair 
comparison of their results. From this figure, we show that clients can get a 
data-integrity message much faster than an encrypted object over HTTPS. 
Data encryption/decryption will burden servers and cause dramatically latency 
especially without session reuse [11]. However, our model does not increase 
servers' loads since servers give out their intentions off-line. More importantly, the 
reusability of data-integrity objects also relieves servers' burden. 
With the consideration of these two aspects, we can conclude that Data Integrity 
Framework has an overwhelming performance advantage over HTTPS when they 
are choices for data integrity. More importantly, our model allows providing 
value-added services by web intermediaries but HTTPS cannot.
 
Figure 8.6: Parallel Notification Generation and Packets Transmission 
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The extra overhead of our model can be decreased with the parallel processing of 
tasks as follows. 
• Parallel notification generation and transmission  
The notification generation time, in practice, may be overlapped with the message 
transmission packet by packet. Due to the network condition, there is an interval 
between packets since a packet may not be sent out before enough data are filled 
in the packet. Although the notification generation may stall the pipeline of 
transmission, the loss is very little now that it amounts to some intervals in the 
transmission. We illustrate this case in Figure 8.6. The first time axis shows the 
packets transmission without notification generation. Each dot marked in the axis 
stands for the time of ready delivery of a packet. When it is time to generate a 
notification during the preparation of the second packet, the ready delivery time 
of the second packet is delayed by t µs. If the interval between the second and the 
third packets is larger than t µs, the transmission of subsequent packets will not be 
affected as shown in the second time axis of the figure. 
• Parallel verification and object retrieval  
When a client intends to retrieve a web page with some objects, our model will cause 
almost the same loss as HTTPS (Figure 8.4) if it verifies the message after 
retrieving the HTML page and retrieves the other objects only after the successful 
verification. However, our model provides different choices to avoid this worse case. 
1. Verifying message after retrieving the HTML page and its objects 
The retrieval process of the web page is the same as a normal HTTP retrieval 
process. After the client receives all the objects, verification will start. This 
method is the simplest one, just to bundle these two tasks together. However, it 
may not be efficient. Firstly there is no parallel processing. Secondly if some 
error is found in the later verification process, some of the retrieved objects are 
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useless. 
2.  Retrieving the page and its objects as usual but verifying the page after retrieving 
it 
In contrast with the first method, the time for verification is earlier and errors (if 
any) can be found earlier. 
3.  Verifying while retrieving the HTML page 
There is some space for improvement of the second method since we can start 
some verification sub-tasks before finishing the retrieval of the HTML page. 
For example, the client may verify the manifests since they are in the beginning 
packages. By employing this method, time is saved and errors can be found as 
soon as possible. Of course, this method will also improve performance in the 
case of single object retrieval. 
• Parallel verification and object presentation 
Usually, the object is shown to users only after object verification. This is to 
guarantee that the users can see correct data, but the price to pay is the longer client 
perceived time. If the correctness of the object is important for users, this method is 
appropriate. But it might not be worthy for users to wait such long perceived time 
delay for relatively non-critical pages such as entertainment web pages. 
In order to meet this need, the object can be shown before or during the ver-
ification. This method is employed, especially when the network is slow and the 
correctness of the object is that critical. On the contrary, it may cause some 
problems such as providing some error information if users are very sensitive to 
the correctness of the object. Although after the verification these errors could be 




In this thesis, we proposed a data integrity framework with the following functionalities 
that a server can specify its authorizations, active web intermediaries can provide 
services in accordance with the server's intentions, and more importantly, a client is 
facilitated to verify the received message with the server's authorizations and 
intermediaries' traces. We implemented the proxy-side of the framework on top of the 
Squid proxy server system and its client-side with Netscape Plug-in SDK. To summarize, 
my contributions are as follows. 
• We defined a data integrity framework, its associated language specification and its 
associated system model to solve the data integrity problem in active, content 
transformation network. 
• We built a prototype of our data integrity model and performed sets of experiments, 
which showed the practicability of our proposal through its low performance 
overhead and the feasibility of data reuse. 
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Data-Integrity Message Syntax 
This appendix specifies the syntax of a data-integrity message. Such a message can be 
verified by the client and hence makes the client clear about the data integrity of the 
received message. 
A.1 Introduction 
Since proxies on the path can be authorized by the server to modify its object, it is a 
big problem to keep data integrity of the message. In order to solve the problem, the 
chapters before in this thesis give a solution. We now define the syntax for a 
data-integrity message here. We first provide an overview and an example of 
data-integrity entity body syntax. We then specify the core of the syntax. 
A.2 Overview and Example 
The main components of a data-integrity entity body may contain manifests, parts with 
header lines, and a list of notifications. A part can contain arbitrary text content. Since 
it is probably a XML document, care should be taken in choosing names so that there 
are no subsequent collisions that violate the ID uniqueness validity constraint [39]. 
In this section, an informal specification and an example are given to depict the 
structure of the syntax of the data-integrity entity body. They may omit attribute and 
details that will be fully explained in the next section. 
A data-integrity entity body is represented by Message element with the fol-
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lowing structure. (Where "?" denotes zero or one occurrence; "+" denotes one or 



































The following simple example is an XML file for a web page based on the 




[m02]  <Manifest Id="manifest_for_x1"> 
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[m03]  MessageURL>http://www.nus.edu.sg/mark1.htm</MessageURL>  
[m04]  <PartInfo> 
[m05] <PartID>1</PartID> 







[m13] <Roles>Content Owner</Roles> 
[m14] </Permission> 
[m15]  </PartInfo> 
[m16]  <Signature Id="firstsignature">  
[m17] <SignedInfo> 
[m18] <CanonicalizationMethod  
Algorithm="http://www.3w.org/TR/2001/REC-xml-cn14-20010315"/> 
[m19] <SignatureMethod Algorithm= "rsa-sha1"/> 
[m20] <Reference URI="#manifest_for_x1" > 




[m25] <SignatureValue> ... </SignatureValue>  
[m26] <KeyInfo> 
<X509data> Server's certificate  </X509data>  
[m27] </KeyInfo> 
[m28]  </Signature> 
[m29]  </Manifest> 
[m30] <Part> 
[m31]  <Headers Content-Owner="proxy1.nus.edu.sg"  
  URL="http://www.nus.edu.sg/mark1.htm#part1"  
  Content-Length="34" Content-Type="text/plain"  
  Expires="Tue, 05,Mar 2002 18:16:15 GMT"/> 
[m32]  <PartID>1</PartID> 
[m33]  <Content>The whole page is one part</Content> 
[m34] </Part> 
[m35] </Message> 
[m02-29] "Manifest" element in the example describes what is authorized by the server. 
Note that "MessageURL" element must be specified in order to identify the object 
that the server specifies the manifest for. 
[m16-28] "Signature" element is just the Signature element specified in [23]. It is 
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used to sign the manifest so that the manifest will not be modified during its delivery. 
[m30-34] "Part" element contains the content of a part with its properties.  
[m31] "Headers" element depicts the properties of the part. Most of its attributes 
are consistent with [26]. 
Since we only add one message header into a normal HTTP message, we depict it 
in the next section. The rest of sections in this chapter focus on the syntax of a 
data-integrity entity body. 
A.3 The DIAction HTTP Header Field 
The DIAction HTTP response header field can be used to indicate the intention of the 
data-integrity response. The value is a URI identifying the intention. A data integrity 
server MUST use this header field when issuing a data-integrity response. 
 
diaction ="DIAction" ":" "URI-reference" URI-reference = <as 
defined in [RFC2396] 
A.4 Additional Syntax 
Before the description of the core syntax, it is necessary to illustrate three things first. 
• Namespace  
This element provides the name space of the schema definition of the message. 
Schema Definition: 
<schema xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"  
xmlns:mn="URL of this document" 
xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">  
targetNamespace="URL of this document" 
elementFormDefault="qualified"> 




• The ds:DigestValueType Simple Type 
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This specification imports a simple type, ds:DigestValueType, from [23]. It 
represents arbitrary-length integers in XML as octet strings. It is used mainly for 
the value of digest. Since it takes less time to generate a digest by [38], MD5 is 
selected as the default method of manifest digest and part digest. 
• The ds:Signature Element  
The ds:Signature element is imported from [23] It is used to present digital 
signature. 
Now it is time to move to the core syntax of a data-integrity entity body. 
A.5 The Message Element 
The Message element is the root element. Implementation MUST generate laxly 
schema valid [43] [17]. Message elements as specified by the following schema. 
 
Schema Definition: 
<element name="Message" type="mn:MessageType"/> 
<complexType name="MessageType"> 
<sequence> 
<element ref="mn:Manifest" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
<element ref="mn:Part" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 




A.6 The Manifest Element 
The Manifest element describes the features of a manifest of an object. A message 
may consist of several manifests. One of them may be from server, and the others 
may come from the proxies, each of which is permitted to do the "Delegate" action. 
A manifest contains the URL of its corresponding object, the information of the 
parts of the object, the digest value and the digital signature of the manifest signed 
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by the server or proxies. The Signature element is imported from [23] and enveloped into 
the Manifest element. 
 
Schema Definition: 
<element name="Manifest" type="mn:ManifestType"/>  
<complexType name="ManifestType"> 
<sequence> 
<element name="MessageURL" type="anyURI"/> 
<element name="ParentManifestDigestValue" 
type="ds:DigestValueType" minOccurs="0"/> 
<element ref="mn:PartInfo" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>  
<element ref="ds:Signature" /> 
</sequence> 
<attribute name="Id" type="ID" use="required"/> 
</complexType> 
A.6.1 The MessageURL Element and 
ParentManifestDigestValue Element 
The MessageURL element specifies which object the manifest is for. It must occur. 
The ParentManifestDigestValue element specifies who delegates the owner of the 
manifest. If the element does not occur, the manifest will be given by server. 
Otherwise, the manifest is given by the proxy who is entitled to the "Delegate" 
action. 
A.6.2 The PartInfo Element 
"PartInfo" is an element that may occur one or more times. It specifies an identity 
of a part, the information of part's digest, and what may be done on the part. 
 
Schema Definition: 
<element name="PartInfo" type="mn:PartInfoType"/> <complexType 
name="PartInfoType"> <sequence> 
<element ref="mn:PartID"/> 
<element ref="mn:PartDigestValue" /> 




A.6.2.1 The PartID Element 
"PartID" is an element to specify the identity of a part. 
 
Schema Definition: 
<element name="PartID" type= "mn:PartID"/> 
<simpleType name ="PartID"> 
<restriction base="string"> 
<pattern value="[0-9]+(.[0-9])+)*"/>  
</restriction> 
</simpleType> 
A.6.2.2 The PartDigestValue Element 
"PartDigestValue" is an element to specify the digest value of a part. 




<element name="PartDigestValue" type="mn:PartDigestValueType"/> 
<complexType name="PartDigestValueType"> <simpleContent> 
<extension base="ds:DigestValueType"> 




A.6.2.3 The Permission Element 
This section defines the permission element. It specifies who can do which kind of 
actions with what restrictions. In addition, it may point out what roles the one 
does actions plays. 
 
Schema Definition: 
<element name="Permission" type="mn:PermissionType"/>  
<complexType name="PermissionType">  
<sequence> 
<element ref="mn:Action" /> 
<element ref="mn:Editor"/ minOccurs="0" 
maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 





A.6.2.4 The Action Element 
"Action" is an element to specify what kind of actions editors can do. By now, the 
choice is limited with five actions: None, Delete, Replace, Transform, and 
Delegate. It can be enriched if other action can be implemented. "None" represents 




<element name="Action" type="mn:ActionType" default="None"/> 
<simpleType name="ActionType"> 
<restriction base="string">  
<enumeration value="None"/>  
<enumeration value="Delete"/>  
<enumeration value="Replace"/> 




A.6.2.5 The Editor Element 
"Editor" is an element to specify who can do the action. It can occur zero, one or 
more times. The content of it is a URI. 
 
Schema Definition: 
<element name="Editor" type="anyURI"/> 
A.6.2.6 The Restricts Element 
"Restricts" is an element to define under what restrictions the editor should do the 
action. By now, the following properties of a part can be taken as restrictions: 
Content-Length, Content-Encoding, Content-Language, Content-Type, Editor, 
Action, and Depth. Among them, "Content-Length" is a string to specify the range 
of the size of a part. For example, a value of 3K means that the size of a part 
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cannot be more than 3 Kbytes. Depth, Editor, and Action elements constraint the 
delegated proxy's authority. Other properties are consistent with [26]. 
 
Schema Definition: 
<element name="Restricts" type="mn:RestrictsType"/>  
<complexType name="RestrictsType"> 
<sequence> 
<element name="Content-Length" type="mn:CLType" minOccurs="0"/> 
<simpleType name="mn:CLType"> 
<restriction base="string"> 
<pattern value="([0-9]+)k?)"/>  
</restriction> 
</simpleType> 
<element name="Content-Encoding" type="string" minOccurs="0"/> 
<element name="Content-Language" type="language" minOccurs="0"/> 
<element name="Content-Type" type="string" minOccurs="0"/> 
<element name="mn:Editor" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
<element name="mn:Action" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
<element name="Depth" type="nonNegativeInteger" minOccurs="0"/> 
</sequence> 
</complexType> 
A.6.2.7 The Roles Element 
"Roles" is an element for a sever or delegated proxies to define the prospective 
roles of the authorized editors by the authorized actions. "Content-Owner" repre-
sents that the ownership of the content will be changed by the action. "Presenter" 
means that although the representation of the content may be changed by some 
editor, its ownership is not entitled to the editor. A "Delegate" action will give the 
part a new authorization, so we use "Authorization-Owner" to show this. 
 
Schema Definition: 









A.7 The Part Element 
The Part element is introduced to delimit the content of an object and provide the 
properties of a part of the object. PartID element has been described in Section 
A.6.2.1. Content element contains the text content of the part. A Part element can 
contain several Part elements as its sub-elements. A sub-element Part describes a 
sub-part of the original part. 
 
Schema Definition: 
<element name="Part" type="mn:PartType"/> 
<complexType name="PartType"> 
<sequence> 




<element name="Content" type="string"/> 




A.7.1 The Headers Element 
"Headers" is an element to specify the properties of a part. The first three attributes 
describe who provides the header. In a Header element, only one of them can be 
specified, which also implies the type of the action on the part. URL attribute 
defines the URL of the part. Other properties are consistent with headers in [26]. 
The Headers element can occur zero or more times. If it does not occur, all the 
properties of the part will be the same as the whole message. If an attribute of the 
element does not occur, the property will be the same as the corresponding property 
of the message or not appropriate to the part. 
 
Schema Definition: 
<element name="Headers" type="mn:HeaderType"/> 
<complexType name="HeaderType">  




<attribute name="Content-Owner" type="anyURI"/>  
<attribute name="Presenter" type="anyURI"/>  
<attribute name="Authorization-Owner" type="anyURI"/>  
<attribute name="URL" type="anyURI"/>  
<attribute name="Pragma" type="string"/>  
<attribute name="Warning" type="string"/>  
<attribute name="Vary" type="string"/>  
<attribute name="Allow" type="string"/> 
<attribute name="Content-Length" type="positiveInteger"/>  
<attribute name="Content-Encoding" type="string"/>  
<attribute name="Content-Language" type="language"/>  
<attribute name="Content-Type" type="string"/>  
<attribute name="Content-Location" type="anyURI"/>  
<attribute name="Content-Range" type="string"/>  
<attribute name="Etag" type="string"/>  
<attribute name="Age" type="positiveInteger"/>  
<attribute name="Vary" type="string"/>  
<attribute name="Cache-Control" type="string"/>  
<attribute name="Expires" type="dateTime"/>  
<attribute name="Last-Modify" type="dateTime"/> 
</attributeGroup> 
A.8 The Notification Element 
The Notification element can occur zero, one, or more times. It contains some 
important information about who does the action, what action it does, on which 
part of an object it does the action and according to which manifest it does the 
action. All the sub-elements in this element have been described in the above 
sections except InputDigestValue and ManifestDigestValue elements. A 
notification element can have several PartDigestValue sub-elements when 
"Delegate" action divides a part into sub-parts whose digest values should be 
declared in a notification. 
 
Schema Definition:
<element name="Notification" type="mn:NotificationType"/>  
<complexType name="NotificationType">  
<sequence> 
<element ref="mn:PartID" /> 
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<element ref="mn:Action" />  
<element ref="mn:Editor" /> 
<element ref="mn:Restricts" minOccurs="0"/>  
<element ref="mn:Roles"/> 
<element ref="mn:InputDigestValue" minOccurs="0">  
<element ref="mn:PartDigestValue" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
<element ref="mn:ManifestDigestValue" />  
<element ref="ds:Signature" /> 
</sequence> 
<attribute name="Id" type="ID" use="required"/>  
</complexType> 
A.8.1 The InputDigestValue Element 
"InputDigestValue" is an element used to record the digest value of the received 
part by a proxy before it does "Transform" action. 
 
Schema Definition: 
<element name="InputDigestValue" type="ds:DigestValueType"/> 
A.8.2 The ManifestDigestValue Element 
ManifestDigestValue element is the digest value of the manifest that directly gives 
the authority to the proxy which gives the notification. Its value must be identical 
with the DigestValue element value of the Signature element in the Manifest ele-
ment. Since the digest value of a manifest is unique, it can tell if a notification is 
consistent with a certain manifest. 
 
Schema Definition: 
<element name="ManifestDigestValue" type="ds:DigestValueType"/> 
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